Friday, July 20, 2012

1207.4786 (Attila Szolnoki et al.)

Defense mechanisms of empathetic players in the spatial ultimatum game    [PDF]

Attila Szolnoki, Matjaz Perc, Gyorgy Szabo
Experiments on the ultimatum game have revealed that humans are remarkably fond of fair play. When asked to share an amount of money, unfair offers are rare and their acceptance rate small. While empathy and spatiality may lead to the evolution of fairness, thus far considered continuous strategies have precluded the observation of solutions that would be driven by pattern formation. Here we introduce a spatial ultimatum game with discrete strategies, and we show that this simple alteration opens the gate to fascinatingly rich dynamical behavior. Besides mixed stationary states, we report the occurrence of traveling waves and cyclic dominance, where one strategy in the cycle can be an alliance of two strategies. The highly webbed phase diagram, entailing continuous and discontinuous phase transitions, reveals hidden complexity in the pursuit of human fair play.
View original: http://arxiv.org/abs/1207.4786

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