B. Wang, X. Chen, L. Wang
Most previous works study the evolution of cooperation in a structured population by commonly employing an isolated single network. However, realistic networks are composed of many interdependent ones coupled with each other, rather than the isolated single network. In this paper, we consider a network including two interdependent networks A and B, which have the same size, and each node in network A probabilistically connects the corresponding node in network B. We introduce the public goods game into such network, and study how the probabilistic interconnection influences the evolution of cooperation. Simulation results show that there exists an intermediate region of interconnection probability leading to the maximum cooperation level in the whole network. Interestingly, we ?nd that at the optimal interconnection probability the fraction of interconnections between cooperators in networks A and B is maximal. Also, even if initially there are no cooperators in one interdependent network, cooperation can still be promoted by probabilistic interconnection, and the cooperation levels in networks A and B can more easily reach agreement at an intermediate interconnection probability. Our results may be helpful in understanding the cooperative behavior in some realistic interdependent networks and thus highlight the importance of probabilistic interconnection on the evolution of cooperation.
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http://arxiv.org/abs/1208.0468
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